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Have Your Cake and Eat it Too: Cognitive
Neurology and Negligence Law in North
Carolina
ABSTRACT

Sometimes a new solution is the best way to fix an old problem.
Currently, relying on a case from the early nineteenth century, North
Carolinacourts refuse to consider an individual's cognitive disability when
determining whether she acted reasonably in a negligence case. In other
words, juries are instructed to hold a mentally disabled individual to the
same duty of care they would use to judge an able-minded individual.
Litigants are not allowed to discuss their clients' mental disabilities. This
puts a great perspective strain on mentally disabled individuals who are
already among the most disenfranchisedgroups in America.
This Comment discusses using modern neurological mapping
technology to present mental disabilities as physical disabilities, which
advocates are permitted to submit to a jury. Therefore, the jury is not
judging a cognitively disabledindividualagainstan unobtainablestandard.
Instead,it is consideringthe effects of differing neural anatomy andjudging
a defendant against a similarperson in a similar situation.
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INTRODUCTION

There has been a terrible accident. The specific nature of the accident
is immaterial and, accordingly, the reader should feel free to include any
specific details that she feels are fitting or entertaining. The crucial factual
basis is simply that, in court, the plaintiff claims that she has been injured as
a direct result of the negligence of the defendant. As a result of this
negligence, the plaintiff s attorney argues in her opening statement, her client
is owed a large sum of money. However, in the defense's opening statement,
the issue becomes confused. As it turns out, the plaintiff was also negligent.
"Now," thinks the judge, "we have a ballgame."
In North Carolina, if the plaintiff in a negligence case assists in creating
the harm, he is not able to recover in court.1 As such, argues the defense
attorney, the plaintiff is owed nothing. In the minds of the jury members, it
is as simple as that.2 However, it only appears simple because an important
part of the story has not been told. The defendant and the plaintiff suffer
from cognitive disabilities that directly affect their abilities to avoid such
negligence. Accordingly, neither party had control over the situation, and to
hold them to the standard of an individual lacking their disorder would be
inherently unfair.
However, this information is not brought before the jury because North
Carolina does not allow the finder of fact to consider an individual's
cognitive or mental disabilities. 3 The case would be different if either party
had a physical disability, such as a visual impairment, as the jury would
4
compare his actions to those of a reasonably prudent blind person. It is
evident how these considerations could change the outcome of the case: by
taking the parties' limitations into account-limitations that were in no way
caused by the parties-the jury would be more able to produce ajust and fair
outcome. The parties could introduce witnesses explaining the specific
challenges caused by their disabilities and the jury, taking these into account,
would be able to make its determinations accordingly.
What if the jury were able to consider these conditions not as a cognitive
disability, but as a side effect of a physical condition? What if a witness
could present a scan of a human brain, point to places or patterns that are
unusual, and explain that an individual with these particular differences can
suffer symptoms associated with the negligence case? Granted, the jury
members might not believe the witness-it is fully within their right to give
1. Clark v. Roberts, 139 S.E.2d 593, 597 (N.C. 1965).
2. For the purposes of this hypothetical, the author respectfully requests that the reader
disregard the doctrine of last clear chance.
3. RESTATEMENT (THJRD) OF TORTS § 11(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
4. Roberts v. State, 396 So. 2d 566, 567 (La Ct. App. 1981).
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this evidence as much weight as they see fit. But at least they would be able
to talk about the evidence and possibly give attention to the differing
experiences and capabilities of persons with cognitive disabilities. This
would allow the jury to better determine whether to soften the standard for
the plaintiffs, as well as to determine whether the defendant was truly and
fairly at fault.
This Comment will explain the great benefits associated with using
cognitive neurology in North Carolina negligence cases. Part I will explain
the intertwined history of negligence law and disability law, with a particular
emphasis on North Carolina-specific implications. Part II will explain the
issues with the law as it is currently applied, as well as provide responses to
the most popular arguments for keeping evidence of cognitive disability from
the jury in negligence cases. A brief primer on cognitive neurology is set
forth in Part III, with a focus on acceptance and use in court. Finally, Part
lV will demonstrate how using cognitive neurology in the courtroom solves
the presented problems with the status quo while mollifying the concerns
voiced by critics. By examining the interplay of these ideas, advocates can
work towards protecting the legal rights of persons with disabilities while
respecting both the needs of aggrieved parties and the centuries of common
law doctrine: a conflict which has frustrated advocates and scholars alike for
decades.'
I.

A.

THE PAST: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGLIGENCE LAW AND THE
DISABLED

The History of Negligence Law in America

Since the mid-nineteenth century, American negligence law has been
inescapably linked to the standard of objective reasonableness. 6 Simply put,
this standard requires that every person "avoid or minimize risks of harm to
others" by acting as "a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar
circumstances." 7 The reasonably prudent person standard can be traced back
to the early English intentional battery case of Weaver v. Ward, which noted
that "in trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or
loss.... no [lunatic] shall be excused.., except it may be judged utterly
without his fault." 8 Initially, this standard categorically refused to grant
exceptions to individuals with different needs and experiences, preferring

5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra notes 51-55.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (2008).
Id.
Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284, 284 (K.B. 1616).
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instead a one-size-fits-all approach. 9 For example, early cases held that
children ° and persons with physical1 1 and cognitive1 2 disabilities were held
to the standard of a "normal" adult.
However, slowly but surely, the negligence standard began to shift, and
expectations were crafted for different groups. For example, courts began
carving out exceptions for children of "tender years" who were incapable of
13
forming the requisite intent due to their age and cognitive status. In Kunz
v. City of Troy, liability was attributed to the city of Troy for failing to
address the danger caused by a saloon counter placed in the middle of a
sidewalk.n This liability was assessed even though the counter would not
have fallen, but for the fact that three young children were "running against
"an
[and] climbing on it."15 The court noted that the law did not require
16
infant before reaching the age of discretion to exercise discretion."
An altered level of care was also eventually afforded to physically
disabled persons. For example, the court compared the actions of a blind
man against those of a reasonably prudent blind person when determining
whether the state was negligent in permitting him to travel to the restroom
without his cane in the government building where he worked. 7 However,
the legal community continues to categorically refuse to alter the level of
care expected from adults with cognitive disabilities. 8 Thus the problem
persists: in negligence, an individual with a cognitive disability will be held
to the same standard as her mentally-able peers.
B.

The History of DisabilityRights in America.

The evolving standard of the duty of care closely mirrors the historical
shifts in public opinion and protections for persons with disabilities. At the
9. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §283 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
10. Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391, 393-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
11. Roberts v. Ring, 173 N.W. 437, 438 (Minn. 1919).
12. Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 450 (N.Y. 1894).
13. Kunz v. City of Troy, 10 N.E. 442, 444 (N.Y. 1887); Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co. v. Boozer,
8 S.W. 119, 121 (Tex. 1888).
14. Kunz, 10 N.E. at 443-44.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 444.
17. Roberts v. State, 396 So. 2d 566, 566-69 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
18. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (recognizing the
reasonably prudent person standard and refusing to comment on application to mentally

disabled persons);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 283 (AM.

LAW INST.

1965) (making

no exception for cognitive disability); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 I(c) (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (affirmatively stating that cognitive disability cannot be a factor in the
examination of the duty element under negligence).

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol41/iss1/5

4

Dittmar: Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Cognitive Neurology and Negligence

2019]

COGNITIVE NEUROLOGY AND NEGLIGENCE LAW IN N.C.

185

beginning of the twentieth century, many prominent thinkers advocated for
the forced sterilization, and societal separation, of persons with disabilities.' 9
This preference was endorsed by the United States Supreme Court when
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that society had an interest in
preventing persons with disabilities from "continuing their kind" because
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles [were] enough."2 The Supreme Court's
decision allowed state courts and legislatures to permit the forced
sterilization of over 30,000 persons with disabilities over the following forty
years.2 This school of thought remained prevalent for decades and only
became confined to the comers of society by a concerted multilateral push
from lawmakers, academic scholars, and disability advocates.22 For
example, North Carolina did not overturn its forced sterilization laws until
2003.23 In fact, In re Sterilizationof Moore, a North Carolina Supreme Court
case which held that forced sterilization was not a violation of North
Carolinian citizens' constitutional rights, has never been explicitly
24
overturned.

Even with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),25
persons with disabilities continued to experience barriers to employment and
public life.26 The hope for better treatment was primarily dashed by the legal
restrictions placed upon Title I of the ADA.27 This section, which
established anti-employment discrimination, took a body blow from the
Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines,28 which attempted to limit

assistance under the ADA to only those who were disabled enough.2 9 In
other words, the Court found that an action under the ADA would only
succeed if the disabled person could demonstrate that she was substantially
precluded from a variety of professional experiences, even after corrective
measures and technologies were provided.3"

19. Henry H. Goddard, Who is a Moron?, 24 Sci. MONTHLY 41, 45 (1927).
20. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
21. Alfred L. Brophy & Elizabeth Troutman, The EugenicsMovement in North Carolina,
94 N.C.L. REv. 1871, 1871 (2016).
22. Paul A. Lombardo, Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. Louis U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 57, 57 (2008).

23. Act of Apr. 17, 2003, ch. 13, sec. 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 13 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 35A-1245).

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 314 (1976).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
Lia S. Davis & Brian East, The ADA at 25, 78 TEX. B.J. 534, 534 (2015).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
Id. at 483.

30. Id.
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The Supreme Court further limited the class of persons protected under
the ADA in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, where
it found that the definition of disability must be strictly interpreted. 3" Under
Toyota and Sutton, people suffering from diabetes, epilepsy, cancer, and
32
other diseases were left without the protections of the ADA. This decision
33
created what MSNBC anchor John Hockenberry called a "revelation." "By
this definition," noted Hockenberry, "the fact that I use a wheelchair to
mitigate my paraplegia suggests I am not disabled. Someone should tell the
doctors working on a cure for spinal cord injury they are wasting their time.
The Supreme Court just beat them to it." 34 During this period, though
employment discrimination claims increased, claims involving disability
discrimination drastically decreased. 35 This suggests that, by limiting
coverage of the ADA, the Court had inadvertently taken the teeth out of a
statute designed to assist disabled Americans.
Many of these issues were addressed in 2008 with the passing of the
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA). 36 The ADAAA addressed the results of
Toyota and Sutton by requiring that disability be construed broadly and
without regard to mitigating factors.3 7 Despite these legal advances, persons
38
with disabilities still face a drastically higher unemployment rate today. In
39
2016, only 17.9% of persons with disabilities were employed. Therefore,
there is still vast distance between the status quo and the "chance [for
disabled persons] to prove themselves" that was articulated by President
George H. W. Bush over a quarter-century ago.4"

31. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 US. 184, 197 (2002).
32. Greenburg v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007);
Todd v. Acad. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala., 507
F.3d 1306, 1315 (1 1th Cir. 2007), supersededby statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 35553, as recognized in Moore v. Jackson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 979
F. Supp. 2d 1251 (2013).
33. John Hockenberry, Disability Games, N.Y. TuviES (June 29, 1999).
34. Id.
35. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, U.S. EQUAL EmP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://perma.cc/RQ6N-S6EC (last visited December 10, 2018).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
37. Id. § 12102(4).
38. Economic News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Persons
with a Disability: Labor Force Characteristics Summary (June 21, 2018),
https://perma.cc/P3UR-HFLD (indicating that approximately 80% of those with disabilities
are considered outside the labor force).
39. Id.
40. Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, EEOC, https://perma.cc/4K5W-8E3T (last visited December 10, 2018).
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C. ContributoryNegligence and Disabilityin North Carolina
The disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities, though
problematic and pernicious on a national scale, sees particularly devastating
results in states like North Carolina, which still utilize the contributory
negligence doctrine. Contributory negligence simply means that, if both
parties are in any way at fault, neither may recover in an action for
negligence. 41 Contributory negligence has been around in some form since
the early 1800s,42 and was adopted by American courts in 1824. 4 1 North
Carolina courts first adopted the doctrine in 1849 when the state supreme
court held that the plaintiff in a railroad collision case could not recover in
damages for harm done to his slaves who had fallen asleep on the tracks.44
Thus contributory negligence in North Carolina stands firm and is commonly
summarized by quoting Clark v. Roberts:
Every person having the capacity to exercise ordinary care for his own safety
against injury is required by law to do so, and if he fails to exercise such care,
and such failure, concurring and cooperating with the actionable negligence
of defendant, contributes
to the injury complained of, he is guilty of
45
contributory negligence.
In other words, if a plaintiff's actions are a proximate or primary cause
of her injuries, regardless of the severity of the defendant's conduct, the
plaintiff cannot recover under negligence. 46 This rule creates "an all-ornothing proposition roundly criticized for its harshness and unfairness." 47
North Carolina is one of only five American jurisdictions which still utilize
the doctrine of contributory negligence.4 s
North Carolinian contributory negligence makes no allowance for
persons with cognitive disabilities. The rule places members of one of the
most disenfranchised subsets of the population in a position where they are
41. See generally W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS

(5th ed.

1984).
42. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
43. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (1 Pick.) 621 (1824).
44. Herring v. Wilmington & Raleigh R.R. Co., 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 402 (1849).
45. Clark v. Roberts, 139 S.E.2d 593, 597 (N.C. 1965).
46. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Johnson, 277 S.E.2d 347, 351 (N.C. 1981) ("Negligence bars
recovery only if it is a proximate cause of the injuries complained of; otherwise, it is of no
legal significance.").
47. Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare
Decisis in North Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 3 (1996).
48. See, e.g., Creel v. Brown, 508 So.2d 684 (Ala. 1987) (Alabama); Harrison v.
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894 (Md. 1983) (Maryland); Hoar v. Great E. Resort
Mgmt., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 777 (Va. 1998) (Virginia); Gober v. Yellow Cab Co., 173 A.2d 915
(D.C. 1961) (Washington, D.C.).
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held to a higher, and often unobtainable, standard.49 Further, due to the
draconian limits of contributory negligence, many disabled persons are
unable to recover under the law.5 ° Persons with disabilities are effectively
held to a strict liability standard in cases of negligence, 5 as they are
medically, physically, or developmentally unable to meet the duty of care
expected of persons without these disabilities. The historical treatment of
persons with disabilities remains pertinent.
II. THE PRESENT: ISSUES WITH THE MODERN DOCTRINE

The reasonably prudent person standard, though relatively wellestablished, presents several persistent problems. For over a century, legal
scholars have continuously noted the heavy weight placed upon the
shoulders of cognitively disabled persons by jurisdictions who use this
standard to determine contributory liability.5 2 Simply put, by refusing to
adopt a subjective test for mentally ill persons-like the tests used for the
physically disabled and children-North Carolina courts continue to create
financial hardships, as well as to "perpetuat[e] stereotypes and
misunderstanding about the mentally ill population."53 Though the rejection
of this subjective standard has been strongly supported by courts54 and
sparsely supported by academic scholarship,55 each of these arguments has

49. See Gardner, supra note 47, at 25-32.
50. See id
51. Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the
Mentally Ill, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67, 67 (1995).
52. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97 (1908); Johnny
Chriscoe & Lisa Lukasik, Re-Examining Reasonableness: Negligence Liability in Adult
Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 1, 80 (2015); W.G.H.
Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 COLuM. L. REv. 333 (1921); William J.
Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 52 (1960);
Okianer Christian Dark, Tort Liability and the "Unquiet Mind": A Proposalto Incorporate
Mental Disabilities into the Standard of Care, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 169 (2004);
Goldstein, supra note 51; John V. Jacobi, Fakers,Nuts, andFederalism:Common Law in the
Shadow of the ADA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 95 (1999); Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of
Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 1 (1995); David E. Seidelson,
Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the
Mentally Impaired,and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17 (1981); Kristin
Harlow, Note, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How Tort Law
Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733 (2007).
53. Harlow, supra note 52, at 1735.
54. Korrell, supra note 52, at 36-37.
55. See, e.g., George J. Alexander & Thomas S.Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse for
Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE DAME L. 24 (1967); Eli K. Best, Atypical Actors and Tort Law's
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been refuted in modern academic scholarship. 6 The Restatement Second of
Torts presented four primary reasons for maintaining the status quo, 57 and
the Restatement Third added a fifth explanation.58
The first issue that the Restatement Second lists is the difficulty in
drawing lines based off mental disabilities.5 9 Because mental disabilities are
difficult to identify, designate, and differentiate, it might be challenging for
the court to know which disabilities require a subjective standard.6" The
proposed risk here is clear: if the court were to get it wrong-if a subjective
standard were presented to an individual for whom it was not needed-then
the integrity of the negligence trial, and any associated verdict, would be put
in jeopardy. 6'
However, it is unarguably the purview and the duty of judges, with
assistance from clerks and advocates, to answer the hard questions.62
Further, North Carolina has established several specialized courts in order to
deal with particularly complex and in-depth issues, including the North
Carolina Business Court63 and the Veterans Court.' It is the duty of the
courts to address legal issues, regardless of their complexity, and particularly
when the apparatus for solution is available.
The Restatement's second issue with creating a subjective standard
primarily involves the perceived risk of fakery.65 It is the concern of the
drafters of the Restatement that, due to the scientific uncertainty of evidence
involving mental disability, it would be possible for individuals to falsify
their mental illness and receive an accordingly "easier" comparative duty of
care. 66 However, it should be noted that the Restatement Second, being
published in 1965, fails to reflect the substantial accuracy of modem
technology and diagnostic procedures. 67 Further, it is unlikely that an

Expressive Function, 96 MARQ. L. REv. 461 (2012); Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability
of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983).
56. See supra note 52.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(1)-b(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
58. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

60. Id.; Best, supra note 55, at 467-68.
61. Cf, id. at 468 (explaining that "there is a risk of people faking disabilities to avoid
liability").
62. See Jacobi, supra note 52, at 112-13.
63.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.3 (2017).

64. Jamie Markham, Veterans Treatment Court, UNC SCH. OF GOV'T: N.C. CRIM. LAW
(Nov. 12, 2014), https://permacc/L6XC-7W8K.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

66. Id.
67. Korrell, supra note 52, at 35-36.
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individual would willingly submit herself to the stigma and possibility of
diminished legal rights associated with establishing, under oath, a severe
68
personal mental disability, let alone the legal penalties of lying under oath.
Upon the publication of the Restatement69 Third, this explanation for the
objective standard was left out altogether.
The third issue presented by the Restatement involves the compensation
of victims.7" If an individual is indeed harmed, and one party causes that
harm, then the aggrieved party should receive some sort of compensation
from the initiator of the harm.7 1 This argument completely disregards one
of the core tenants of tort law: that there should be no prescription of
damages without fault.72 In a search for a culprit, North Carolina courts
should not take pride in finding a person to blame; it is their duty to find the
person deserving of blame. Though assuredly a victim is entitled to damages
for her pain and suffering, the basic tenants of the law of torts suggest that
those damages should come from an individual who has been found liable
under all of the facts.73 A jury should be able to consider an individual's
74
capabilities when determining whether that individual acted reasonably.
Though a person with a cognitive disability should not be given a "pass"
because of her disability, neither should the victim be provided a blank check
because of their adversary's disability.
Finally, the Restatement notes that it is the responsibility of the
cognitively disabled person's caretaker to more carefully look after her
charges.7 5 This point is problematic in several ways. First, it presumes that
persons with disabilities need, or should have, a caretaker. While caretakers
and medical assistants are important, and occasionally necessary, it is the
purview of the disability rights movement to promote independence,
whenever possible.76 While there is no requirement that an individual go
without needed assistance, that decision should be made entirely on the
preferences and needs of the disabled individual, rather than out of fear of
legal retribution. This Restatement argument, like the risk of fakery, was
removed from the Restatement Third in 2010. 77
68. Goldstein, supra note 51, at 76.
69. Best, supra note 55, at 468.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
71. Best, supra note 55, at 468.
72. See Jacobi, supra note 52, at 112-13.
73. Id. at 114 n.117.
74. Best, supra note 55, at 500.
75. Id. at 468.
76. See Faye Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp, Making Accessible Futures: From the Capitol
Crawl to #cripthevote, 39 CARDozo L. REv. 699, 714-18 (2017).
77. Best, supra note 55, at 468.
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The Restatement Third introduced a new argument: that persons with
cognitive disabilities are unable to modulate their own behavior in order to
avoid risk or reduce harm. 78 During the drafting process, the editors of the
Restatement also noted concern that, with deinstitutionalization (the
movement by which independence was favored over use of mental hospitals
and institutional wards), the public needed to be "protected from people with
mental illness." 79 Though behavior moderation is challenging, multiple
programs are put in place to assist with the creation of society-safe norms
and behaviors.8" Further, the presumption that individuals with mental
disabilities are "unsafe" propels a pernicious stereotype against which the
disabled community has been actively fighting for decades. 8
This
argument, though perhaps sufficiently stable on the surface, fails to hold
water.
These arguments apply equally to both cognitively disabled plaintiffs
and defendants in comparative negligence cases. At least for defendants, the
answer appears clear: no subjective standard will be created.82 However,
some states have created a slightly altered standard for mentally disabled
plaintiffs.8 3 North Carolina has already proven open to making allowances
for certain types of plaintiffs, including children' and rescuers.8 " In each of
these cases, North Carolina has barred any contributory negligence claims
against the plaintiffs absent a rebuttable presumption.8 6 However, when
given the opportunity to make a similar prohibition against alleging
contributory negligence against the mentally disabled, North Carolina took
a different route.
In Stacy v. Jedco Construction, Inc., the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that a mentally ill plaintiff in a
contributory negligence case should be held to "the standard of care of a
person of like mental capacity under similar circumstances."8 7 In the case,
78. RESTATEMENT (TLRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft

No. 1, 2005); Best, supra note 55, at 479; Harlow, supranote 52, at 1735.
80. Best, supra note 55, at 479.
81. Harlow, supra note 52, at 1735.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010).

83. See Noel v. McCaig, 258 P.2d 234, 240 (Kan. 1953); Feldman v. Howard, 214 N.E.2d
235, 237-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), rev'd, 226 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio 1967); Snider v. Callahan,
250 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 162-63 (N.J. 1988).
84. Hoots v. Beeson, 159 S.E.2d 16, 19 (N.C. 1968); Weeks v. Barnard, 143 S.E.2d 809,
810 (N.C. 1965) (per curiam).
85. See Caldwell v. Deese, 218 S.E.2d 379, 382-83 (N.C. 1975); Alford v. Washington,
78 S.E.2d 915, 920 (N.C. 1953).
86. See Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 103 S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (N.C. 1958).
87. Stacy v. Jedco Constr., Inc., 457 S.E.2d 875, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
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John Purser suffered a fractured hip as a result of the negligently prepared
and maintained construction site in his retirement home.88 Purser had been
warned several times to avoid the construction site but, as a result of his poor
short-term memory (an effect of his senile dementia), he returned time and
again. 89 The Court of Appeals held that Purser's actions should be compared
9
to those of a person with his same condition in his same situation. " The
Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial, instructing the trial court that it
did, in fact "exercise... such care as he
should determine whether Purser
91
exercising."
of
was capable
This case was simple because short-term memory loss is relatively
understandable to a trier of fact, so the average juror should, after hearing
evidence, be able to perform this balancing test. The issue becomes more
challenging with less defined mental disabilities or conditions, which less
directly affect the suffered harm, such as depression, autism, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Simply put, the finder of fact needs reliable facts
in order to avoid the possible pitfalls explored and endorsed by the
Restatement. Luckily, with modern neuro-technology, those facts are within
reach.

III. THE SOLUTION: A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF NEURO-MAPPING IN THE LAW
Though the idea of a legal revolution seems inherently oxymoronic,
there appears to be no better way to describe the current impending crash
between neuroscience and law. 92 In order to have some success predicting
the outcome of this coming-together, it is necessary to provide the basic
background behind cognitive neuroscience and, more specifically, neuromapping.
Cognitive neuroscience, or "the field of scientific endeavor that is trying
to understand how the brain enables the mind," 93 has only come about
relatively recently. Its primary goal: to understand why and how we think,
as well as to examine influencing factors on our thought processes.94 The

88. Id. at 878.
89. Id. at 877.
90. Id. at 879.
91. Id. at 881, 879. This case was examined, and rejected, as persuasive authority in
Jankee v. Clark Cty., 612 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 2000).
92. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a NeuroscienceModel of Tort Law:
How FunctionalNeuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLuM. Sci. & TECH. L.
REv. 235 (2012).
93. See Michael S. Gazzaniga, What is CognitiveNeuroscience?, in A JUDGE'S GUEDE TO
NEUROSCIENCE: A CoNCIsE INTRODUCTION 2 (2010), https://perma.cc/G75Z-G84J.

94. Id.
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importance of this science cannot be overstated. It may be possible to
introduce objective scientific evidence to expose the murkiest, but most often
at issue, aspects of an individual. For example, researchers have successfully
identified physical traits in the human brain connected to dementia 95 and
post-traumatic stress disorder.96 Modem tests also make it possible to
identify the parts and processes of the brain which are utilized in high-level
97
ethical decision making.
It may even be possible to identify an uncontrollable biological
response caused by personal bias. This research could be used in the context
of employment discrimination cases through the introduction of anatomical
evidence to identify biological responses, rather than arguing over rebuttable
presumptions. 98 For example, a racist person's brain may recognizably
change when confronted with a person against whom the individual holds a
private bias. 99 Though some criticize the research in this area as premature
and underdeveloped,' 0 0 even its most ardent critics note that these issues may
be solved as efficient peer-reviewed research continues.10 1
Out of the several options available, attorneys involved in advocacy and
litigation will likely be most interested in PET scans and fMRI (functional
magnetic resonance imaging). PET scans (positron emission tomography
scans) involve the observation of movements of "small quantities of
radioactive chemicals" which are introduced via injection. 102 By observing
the movement and connections between these chemicals, technicians can
determine which aspects of the brain are active while the participant
completes tasks. 103

95. See Li Wang et al., Performance-BasedPhysical Function and Future Dementia in
Older People, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1115 (2006).
96. Lisa Shin et al., Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in the Amygdala and Medial
Prefrontal Cortex During Traumatic Imagery in Male and Female Vietnam Veterans with
PTSD, 61 ARcFHvES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 168 (2004).

97. Gazzaniga, supra note 93.
98. Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the
Field,42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 698 (2009) [hereinafter Greely, Law and the Revolution].
99. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation
PredictsAmygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000).
100. Guy Kahane & Nicholas Shackel, Methodological Issues in the Neuroscience of
Moral Judgment, 25 MIND&LANGUAGE 561,565-72 (2010).
101. See generally Gazzaniga, supra note 93.
102. Eggen & Laury, supra note 92, at 240; see also PET Scan, CLEVELAND CLINIC,
http://perma.cc/ YB2D-QXHC (last visited December 10, 2018).
103. Eggen & Laury, supra note 92, at 240.
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fMRI involves the use magnet and radio waves to develop a detailed
representation of the structures of the brain.1 1 4 The fMRI provides a clearer
and accurate depiction of the anatomical differences in the participant's brain
and, due to its advanced technology, represents brain activity by examining
blood-oxygen levels,1" 5 and the dilation of small blood vessels in operating
portions of the brain."0 6 Simply put, the fMRI allows a technician to see
differences in the brain, as well as the ways in which the brain operates and
responds to specific stimuli.
Even as the scientific community works to further develop and establish
this novel field, courts have already shown great interest in the expanded
possibilities offered by research. Many courts across the world have actively
permitted, and even relied upon, neuroscience. 107 Several criminal cases, for
example, have made use of cognitive neurology in various phases of trial.o
Brain scans have been permitted during sentencing to demonstrate the
defendant's incompetence.' 09 In fact, the United States Supreme Court made
use of cognitive neurology in Roper v. Simmons.1 10 Relying heavily on an
amicus brief, which used brain scans to demonstrate the lack of cognitive
development in children, the Court held that it was a violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to sentence an individual to the death penalty
when the crime was committed before the defendant reached age eighteen. I'
The Supreme Court again made use of brain scan information in 2011
when, in a civil case, it wrote on the difference between causal and
correlating cognitive evidence.112 The majority in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association noted that the legislature's passing reference to the
effect of violent video games on the development of children's frontal lobes

104. Id. at 240-41; see also What is fMRI?, U.C. SAN DIEGO SCH. OF MED.,
https://perma.ccN7PN-DNV7 (last visited December 10, 2018).
105. Eggen & Laury, supra note 92, at 241.
106. Id.; see Daniel D. Langleben et al., True Lies: Delusions and Lie-Detection
Technology, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 351, 358-61 (2006) (giving a more thorough discussion
of fMRI testing).
107. See Dominique J. Church, Note, Neuroscience in the Courtroom: An International
Concern, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1825 (2012).
108. See Scott T. Grafton, Has Neuroscience Already Appeared in the Courtroom?,in A
JUDGE'S GUIDE TO NEUROSC1ENCE: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 54, 54-55 (2010).
109. See United States v. Hammer, 404 F.Supp. 2d 676, 723 (M.D. Pa. 2005), reh'g
denied, 404 F. Supp. 2d 676 (2006); State v. Marshall, 27 P.3d 192, 199 (Wash. 2001).
110. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
111. Id. at 578 ("The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.").
112. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 798-99 (2011).
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was not persuasive.I13 However, in his dissent, Justice Breyer exhaustively
discussed cognitive mapping technology."1 4 One need look no further than
the two extensive appendices that Justice Breyer attached to his opinion to
note that even the highest court of the land is at least open to the idea of
introducing this evidence.1 15 Specifically, after making reference to
"[c]utting-edge neuroscience,"' 116 Justice Breyer listed just under one
hundred and fifty peer-reviewed scientific articles discussing the effect of
violent videogames on children's brain structures.1 17
As previously noted, there are some issues with the introduction of
cognitive neuroscience. Some scholars argue that the introduction of brain
scans could lead to the invasion of privacy and the erosion of ethical
norms."' Others make note of the possible evidentiary concerns with the
admissibility of the documents themselves,1 19 as well as the expert testimony
necessary to interpret and explain the documents for the finder of fact. 120
However, advocates and courts can largely diminish these challenges and
limitations through guiding expert testimony-related jury instructions,
adhering to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,121 and ruling on
admissibility of evidence before the start of trial.' 22
Judges and legal
scholars alike note the inherent difference, between scientific and legal

113. Id. at 799 ("[T]he State claims that it need not produce [proof of a causal link] because
the legislature can make a predictive judgment that such a link exits, based on competing
psychological studies.").
114. Id.at 840-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. Id.at 858-72.
116. Id. at852.
117. Id. at858-72.
118. See Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience: Legal
Problems, Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE,

AND POLICY 245, 253 (Judy Illes ed., 2006) [hereinafter Greely, The Social Effects]; Stacey
A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for Future
Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 47 (2007).
119. See Jed S. Rakoff, Science and the Law: Uncomfortable Bedfellows, 38 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1379, 1388 (2008).
120. Eggen & Laury, supra note 92; Christina T. Liu, Note, Scanning the Evidence: The
EvidentiaryAdmissibility of Expert Witness Testimony on MRI Brain Scans in Civil Cases in
the Post-DaubertEra, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 479 (2015). Though the evidentiary
issues with this type of evidence are real, they have been discussed more exhaustively
elsewhere. See id.; see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 92, at 279-84. Suffice to say that
these issues are present but, with proper attention, may be successfully navigated by a
competent attorney. Further, these issues will continue to diminish as modem neurological
scans grow more accurate and efficient.
121. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Ph arm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
122. See Liu, supra note 120, at 486. The specifics of the evidentiary concerns will not
be discussed in full in this Comment.
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standards best summarized in 1994: "[s]cientific conclusions are subject to
perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and
quickly." 123
However, even with the issues discussed above, cognitive neuroscience
24 The
has the capability to provide great assistance in negligence cases.
Supreme Court already made use of FMRI scans to abolish the death penalty
for children, 2 5 so the opportunity to use modem technology to change an
outdated system is unarguably before us.
IV. THE FUTURE: UTILIZING NEURAL MAPPING TO SOLVE PERSISTENT
PROBLEMS

It is possible to make use of the FMRJ and PET scan technology
discussed above in order to avoid the prohibition against altering the
reasonable standard for defendants and plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities.
This possibility has been broadly discussed and advocated for by legal
scholars,' 2 6 but it has never been discussed in light of North Carolina's
particular eccentricities. North Carolina's courts show great flexibility in
some ways but refuse to budge in others.127 However, by making use of
modem technology, courts can have their cake and eat it too: they can
maintain their preference for not considering mental disabilities, and they
can avoid holding persons with disabilities to strict scrutiny in negligence
cases.
Take, for example, the hypothetical which began this comment. There
was an accident (whichever accident the reader prefers) involving two
negligent and cognitively disabled individuals. With this approach, the jury
is not being asked to hold the parties to unreasonably lofty standards. Neither
is the court creating ad hoc precedent which will diminish the efficacy of
civil tort law. Instead, the jury is presented with evidence regarding the
2 8 This
litigants' altered brain structure and corresponding challenges.
evidence is analogous to the use of an expert to demonstrate an individual's
unusual eye anatomy, diminished vision, and accompanying challenges and
123. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
124. Eggen & Laury, supra note 92, at 265.
125. Brown v. Entm'tMerchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 798-99 (2011).
126. Eggen & Laury, supra note 92; Greely, The Social Effects, supra note 118; Shaun
Cassin, Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible Injuries: Can Neuroscience Challenge
Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HouS. L. REv. 929 (2013).
127. See supra notes 58-61.
128. Assuredly, not all such disabilities have neurological differences which can be
noticed with current technology. However, many disabilities are observable through physical
neural difference, and half a loaf is better than no loaf at all.
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differing needs. This type of evidence was used in Roberts v. State, 129 where
the defendant used an expert to illustrate the challenges, and best practices,
of a person with a visual impairment.
If this sort of evidence is presented, the jury is not tasked with applying
a cognitive disability. Instead, the members of the jury are comparing the
actions of the defendant to those of a person with the same differentiated
brain structure. Granted, all brains are different, and physical changes in
neural anatomy can be different, depending on the individual. 3 0 However,
it is the responsibility of the expert witness and the advocate to convince the
finder of fact to believe the relevant testimony. Again, the jury is within its
rights to disregard the evidence, but having access to the testimony, with the
proper safeguards, can do no harm.
By allowing this evidence before the finder of fact, North Carolina
courts will be able to overcome the de facto strict liability applied to
defendants,13 1 as well as bolster the possibility of arguing the subjective
standard permitted to cognitively disabled plaintiffs. Further, by allowing
this information to be presented through scientific data, courts will be able
to completely avoid the five criticisms discussed in the Restatement Second
and Third of Torts: (1) line drawing; (2) risk of fakery; (3) compensation; (4)
32
caretaker liability; and (5) behavior modification. 1
The issue of line drawing would be inherently fixed by the production
of cognitive neurological evidence. If the concern is where to grant a legal
reprieve, that concern would be mollified by the production of testimony
regarding the person's capabilities. Granted, it is possible that even the most
mundane differences could be trotted out before the jury. However, it is the
job of the finders of fact to determine how much weight is given to any sort
of evidence; if they find an argument regarding a diminished duty of care
unpersuasive and accordingly disregard the evidence, they possess that right.
This issue, if it exists, would come out in the wash.
The production of PET or FMRI scans would likewise almost eliminate
the risk of fakery. 13 3 The jury would be able to see the scans, hear the
testimony, and judge the results based on their own perception. Further, risk
of fakery is a constant issue in trials, regardless of the specific law at issue.
129. Roberts v. State, 396 So.2d 566, 568 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
130. See Jaymes V. Fairfax-Columbo & David DeMatteo, Are Bioequivelants Really
Equal?: Generic Substitution in the Context of Mental Illness, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 281
(2015).
131. Gardner, supra note 47.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(1)-(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt..

e (AM.

LAW INST.

2010).

133. Eggen & Laury, supra note 92.
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Even though witnesses are under oath, for example, it is not unheard of for
half-truths or outright falsehoods to come from the witness stand. Further,
though the bar of entry for expert witnesses is relatively high, it is a poorly
kept secret that an expert witness can be found to support most any assertion.
These issues, though present, are by no means specific to the presentation of
cognitive neurological data. To refuse this data on these grounds, while
continuing to allow other types of evidence, would be hypocritical to say the
least.
The compensation issue remains unchanged. It is the duty of the finder
of fact to determine from whom damages should be demanded.134 Having
more information can only assist the jury in this task. Further, the
presentation of this evidence for defendants would stop the current practice
of demanding compensation from individuals simply because they were held
to an unobtainable standard.' 3 5 If it is, indeed, the duty of thejury to examine
all evidence and make a determination and if that determination is paramount
to the successful dispensation of justice, then allowing this evidence would
only assist finders of fact in their noble goal.
To the issue of caretaker liability, the presentation of neurological
information would assist the growing population who possesses a cognitive
disability and does not make use of a personal caretaker. Caretakers can be
expensive, and to require that any individual with a cognitive disability make
the choice between expensive and prospectively invasive personal care or
strict liability in the event of an accident seems to be the height of poor
13 6
planning.
Finally, the presentation of this evidence would help the jury determine
whether persons with cognitive disabilities are actually able to modify their
behavior. It is problematic to say that a person with a proven visual disability
should simply "learn to see better." It is a false assumption to assume that a
person with a legitimate and proven cognitive disability could do the same.
Therefore, by establishing actual metric data for invisible disabilities,
advocates will be able to assist the finders of fact in making proper and fair
decisions.

134. Dobbs, supra note 6.
135. Gardner, supra note 47.
136. While the neurological scans discussed in this Comment can be expensive, those
expenses can be covered in attorneys and testing fees at the end of trial or can play a role in
the negotiation phase of litigation. Further, many of these scans can be retrieved from
diagnosing physicians' records for little to no cost.
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CONCLUSION

If North Carolina is concerned about the inherent unfairness in holding
cognitively disabled defendants to a strict liability standard (as it should be),
and if North Carolina wishes to assist advocates in arguing for the use of a
subjective standard for cognitively disabled plaintiffs in negligence cases (as
it should), then North Carolina advocates should actively explore the
possibilities offered by the introduction of cognitive neurological data. If
advocates and courts are unable to use this neuroscience to prove their cases,
then the risk of harm to cognitive disabled individuals (one of the most atrisk minorities in the state) is incredibly high. Though the only risk in civil
cases is financial in nature, imposing such a burden onto a group which
experiences exponentially higher unemployment rates is neither effective
nor ethical.
Hesitation is understandable: the common law principle has stood
strong for centuries. Advocates may not know that this technology is
available, and courts may be unaware of how to safely implement the scans
into trials. However, the technology does exist, and can allow the
maintenance of the subjective test which North Carolina courts seem to
prefer, while promoting the equitable treatment of cognitively disabled
litigants. In other words, the implementation of the evidence explored in this
Comment will allow the courts to have their cake and eat it too.
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